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PERSPECTIVE/OPINION
Conditioning is More Than Association Formation: 
On the Different Ways in Which Conditioning Research 
is Valuable for Clinical Psychology
Jan De Houwer
Cognitively-oriented clinical psychologists sometimes think of conditioning as the formation of associations 
in memory. From this perspective, conditioning research is important because it reveals the conditions 
under which potentially pathogenic associations are formed and can be changed. In this paper, I point 
out that it is also possible and useful to think of conditioning in ways that do not refer to associations. 
First, based on the idea that conditioning effects are due to the formation of propositional beliefs, it 
is possible to appreciate that conditioning research informs us about one way of forming or revising 
beliefs: via the experience of events. Second, conditioning research reveals the environmental causes of 
behavior and behavior change and thus has merit regardless of ideas about the cognitive processes and 
representations that mediate conditioning. By discussing these different perspectives on conditioning as 
well as the way in which they are related, I hope to provide the reader with a wider appreciation of the 
merits of conditioning research for clinical psychology. 
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Conditioning research has been and still is a major 
source of inspiration for clinical psychology (e.g., Craske, 
Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014; Watson 
& Rayner, 1920; Wolpe, 1958). The aim of this paper is 
not to question this claim but rather to qualify it. Many 
cognitively-oriented clinical psychologists continue to 
think of conditioning primarily in terms of the formation 
of associations in memory (e.g., Craske, Hermans, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2006; Craske et al., 2014). They see 
conditioning research as informing them about ways in 
which pathogenic associations in memory are formed 
and how their impact can be counteracted.1 Although 
this point of view certainly has merits, there are other 
perspectives on conditioning that highlight other virtues 
of conditioning research. In this paper, I aim to describe 
several of these perspectives as well as the relation 
between them, thus clarifying different ways in which 
conditioning research can provide inspiration for clinical 
research and practice. The focus will be on conceptual 
issues rather than on concrete implications for clinical 
research and practice. Nevertheless, I hope that this paper 
will be of interest to all who wish to understand the 
relevance of conditioning research for clinical psychology, 
be it to further their academic research or their clinical 
practice. 
The perspectives that I focus on cut across two 
fundamentally different approaches in psychology, being 
the cognitive and functional approach. Whereas functional 
psychologists are interested primarily in (abstract 
descriptions of) the relation between environment and 
behavior, cognitive researchers aim to uncover the mental 
mechanisms via which environmental events influence 
behavior. In contrast to the idea that both approaches 
are mutually exclusive competitors, my colleagues and 
I put forward a functional-cognitive framework that 
allows for mutually beneficial interactions between the 
two approaches (De Houwer, 2011; Hughes, De Houwer, 
& Perugini, 2016). As long as researchers are clear about 
whether they adopt the aims of functional or cognitive 
psychology, they can exploit work within the other 
approach to further the aims of their own approach. The 
current paper also fits within this framework. It describes 
both cognitive ideas about the role of conditioning in 
clinical psychology, as well as functional ideas on this 
topic. The aim of the paper is not to determine which 
approach to conditioning is superior but to describe the 
different perspectives and shed some light on why at least 
some people see merit in a particular perspective, as well 
as on how the different perspectives relate. 
After sketching the associative perspective on 
conditioning and how it has enriched clinical research, 
I put forward two other ways of thinking about the 
role of conditioning in clinical psychology (see Table 
1 for an overview). First, propositional models of 
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conditioning provide an alternative for associative models 
at the cognitive level of explanation by postulating that 
conditioning is due to the formation of propositional 
beliefs (De Houwer, 2009, 2018a; Mitchell, De Houwer, 
& Lovibond, 2009). From this perspective, conditioning 
research can inform us about how the co-occurrence 
of events results in propositional beliefs that underlie 
psychological suffering, as well as ways in which 
these beliefs can be altered or their impact reduced 
(Lovibond, 2011). The second alternative is situated at 
the functional level of explanation (Skinner, 1953). At 
the functional level, conditioning research reveals the 
way in which environmental events induce and reduce 
psychological suffering, regardless of one’s ideas about 
the cognitive processes and representations that are 
involved conditioning. When viewed from the perspective 
of Relational Frame Theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016; Törneke, 
2010), conditioning research even sheds light on complex 
relational behavior. In sum, conditioning research is 
relevant for clinical psychology in more ways than one 
might think.
An Illustration of How Association Formation 
Models of Conditioning and (Exposure) 
Treatment Inform Clinical Research and Practice
Consider the following example. A cognitively-oriented 
psychotherapist sees a patient who is terrified of flying. 
Based on what she knows about (classical) conditioning 
research and its relation to fear and anxiety in clinical 
practice (e.g., Craske et al., 2006; Grillon, 2008), the 
therapist formulates the hypothesis that the patient 
experiences fear of flying because he has formed an 
association in memory between flying and death. This 
association might have been formed as the result of a 
traumatic event during which the patient had a panic 
attack mid-flight, just like the pairing of a triangle and an 
electric shock in fear conditioning studies would result in 
an association between the triangle and shock, resulting 
in fear of the shock. Hence, the therapist infers that she 
needs to get rid of the association if she wants to get rid 
of the patient’s fear.
Until recently, it was thought that exposure treatments 
are an effective way of getting rid of associations in 
memory and hence of treating the fear caused by those 
associations (Wolpe, 1958). Therapists were therefore 
inclined to treat the patient by exposing him to (flights 
with) airplanes. To continue our example, imagine 
that the therapist is also aware of the recent literature 
on so-called inhibitory learning, that is, the idea that 
exposure treatment does not result in the elimination 
of old excitatory associations but the formation of novel 
inhibitory associations (see Craske et al., 2014, and 
Craske, Hermans, & Vervliet, 2018, for more details). For 
instance, when the patient is exposed to airplanes during 
therapy and experiences that he is not dying, the original 
association between flying and death would be left intact 
but supplemented with an inhibitory association between 
flying and death. Provided that the inhibitory association 
is strong and active, it cancels out the effect of the other 
(excitatory) association, thus eliminating fear. 
Our scientist-practitioner has also learned that according 
to the inhibitory learning model (Craske et al., 2014, 
2018), inhibitory associations might sometimes be weak 
and active only in the contexts in which they were formed 
(e.g., the context of being in an airplane together with the 
therapist). Hence, steps need to be taken to strengthen 
the inhibitory associations and to broaden the range of 
contexts in which the inhibitory associations are active. 
For instance, some association formation models predict 
that the extent to which association strength changes is 
a function of the extent to which events are unexpected 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Therefore, exposure 
experiences that are surprising (e.g., the fact that nothing 
bad happens to the patient when an airplane actually 
takes off and lands) should result in stronger inhibitory 
associations than less surprising events (e.g., the fact that 
nothing bad happens to the patient when he looks at an 
airplane from the outside). Likewise, providing exposure 
experiences in multiple contexts (e.g., with and without 
the presence of the therapist) would result in inhibitory 
associations that are active in multiple contexts and 
would thus broaden the impact of the exposure treatment 
on fear. Inspired by these ideas, empirical evidence has 
been collected showing that the effectiveness of exposure 
treatment can indeed be improved by using variants of 
exposure therapy that, according the inhibitory learning 
model, strengthen and broaden the impact of inhibitory 
associations (Craske et al., 2014, 2018). 
Propositional Models of Conditioning and Their 
Relevance for Clinical Psychology
On the Nature of Propositions
The example provided in the previous section was 
meant to illustrate how association formation models 
of conditioning have continued to evolve and to inspire 
clinical psychologists. Models like the inhibitory learning 
model should indeed be celebrated for generating 
predictions that have been supported not only in the lab 
Table 1: Overview of the Merits of Conditioning Research 
from the Perspective of Different Approaches and 
Theories in Psychology.
Approach/Theory Merits of Conditioning Research 
Cognitive/Association 
Formation
Study the impact of the spatio-
temporal pairing of events on 
the formation of and changes in 
potentially pathogenic associations
Cognitive/Propositional Study the impact of the spatio-
temporal pairing of events on the 
formation of and changes in beliefs
Functional/Pre-RFT Study the spatio-temporal pairing 
of events as a cause of behavior 
(without making assumptions 
about mental processes)
Functional/RFT Study the spatio-temporal pairing 
of events as a cue for relating events 
(without making assumptions 
about mental processes)
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but also in clinical practice. But these successes do not 
imply that association formation models of conditioning 
are correct, or that they provide the most useful way to 
think about the role of conditioning in clinical psychology. 
Based on the idea that the earth is flat, one can also make 
predictions that hold (e.g., the fact that the sun rises each 
morning and sets each evening) but few would argue that 
the flat earth theory is correct or that it is the most useful 
model to successfully navigate the globe. More generally, 
lay people as well as scientists often fall prey to the fallacy 
of affirming the consequent: if A then B; B is true; hence 
A is true. There is a simple reason why this argument is 
fallacious: the same conclusion (e.g., prediction) often 
follows from multiple premises (e.g., theories).
Within the context of the present paper, these 
philosophical considerations are merely meant to 
highlight the fact that clinical psychologists are free to 
consider the possibility that conditioning effects are due 
to mechanisms other than association formation and to 
explore whether those new ideas are useful for them. 
Highlighting this option is far from trivial given the fact 
that association formation models of conditioning are so 
dominant that many (clinical) psychologists even define 
conditioning as the (automatic) formation of associations 
(e.g., Evans, Jamal, & Foxall, 2006) and thus are unable to 
consider the possibility that conditioning effects might be 
due to other types of cognitive processes (see De Houwer, 
2018b, for a brief historic overview). Some conditioning 
researchers, however, do take serious the idea that 
conditioning effects are due to cognitive processes 
other than association formation, more specifically the 
formation of propositions (De Houwer, 2009, 2018a; 
Mitchell et al., 2009). In the following paragraphs, I briefly 
describe what propositional models of conditioning entail 
and how they could provide an alternative explanation 
for the phenomena that were predicted by the inhibitory 
learning model. At the end of this section, I argue that 
propositional models even have benefits for cognitively-
oriented clinical psychologists that go beyond those of 
associative models of conditioning.
Whereas associations in memory are merely links 
between representations via which activation can spread, 
propositions are beliefs in a cognitive sense, that is, 
mental representations of statements about events in 
the world (see Lagnado et al., 2007, for an excellent 
discussion of the difference between associations and 
propositions). Statements are inherently relational, that 
is, they always relate one thing to another thing (e.g., “A 
is B”, “A co-occurs with B”, “A causes B”). As a result, they 
can capture differences in the way that things are related. 
For instance, some patients might believe that being in 
an airplane is likely to cause their death (e.g., because of 
a crash or a lack of oxygen in the airplane). Other patients 
might believe that flying makes their death more likely 
rather than actually causing it, for instance, by not being 
able to get to a hospital in time when they would have a 
heart attack mid-flight. From the perspective of current 
association formation models, both types of patients 
would have in memory an association between flying and 
death. But only propositions can differentiate between 
the fact that the first group of patients sees the airplane 
as a direct cause of their death whereas the second group 
sees the airplane merely as a context in which other 
causes of death are more threatening. In addition to being 
inherently relational, propositions also have a truth value 
in a philosophical sense: that which is stated can, at least 
in principle, be true or false. Associations, on the other 
hand, do not have a truth value because they do not state 
anything; they just are. This has the important implication 
that inferences require propositional representations. 
Inferences involve the transfer or transformation of the 
truth of premises (If A is present then B is present; A is 
present) to the truth of conclusions (B is present). Hence, 
they require propositional representations because only 
those representations have a truth value. Given the central 
nature of inferences in human cognition (De Houwer, 2019; 
Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 2010), it is safe to conclude 
that propositions are also vital for human cognition. In 
sum, compared to simple associations, propositions are 
much more rich in terms of the information that they 
can capture and the information processing that they 
allow for. It is for this reason that I maintain the position 
that propositional representations are the bedrock of the 
mental world (De Houwer, 2009, 2018b, 2019). 
On the Relevance of Propositional Models for Clinical 
Psychology
Do propositional theories also provide a viable alternative 
for association formation theories in clinical psychology, 
for instance, when we look at our patient who is terrified 
of flying an airplane? First, they indeed provide a potential 
cognitive explanation for the role of conditioning in 
psychological suffering. For instance, in line with cognitive 
theories of fear and panic (e.g., Clark, 1986), fear of flying 
might well result from propositional beliefs about flying 
(e.g., that being in an airplane causes suffocation or 
increases the probability that a heart attack will be fatal). 
Importantly, these beliefs could have resulted from a 
traumatic experience such as having a panic attack mid-
flight, just like the pairing of a triangle and shock could 
result in the belief that the triangle predicts the shock. 
Second, propositional theories can also shed light on 
the cognitive processes that mediate the effects of clinical 
interventions. For instance, from the perspective of 
propositional models of conditioning, exposure treatment 
can have an effect by creating new beliefs. For instance, 
during exposure therapy, our patient might learn that 
being in an airplane sometimes does not cause death by 
suffocation. Based on what we know about belief formation, 
it also makes sense to assume that novel beliefs are more 
likely to be formed or to be seen as more convincing when 
they result from surprising, unexpected events than when 
they result for unsurprising events. Likewise, novel beliefs 
can be very context dependent (e.g., the belief that being in 
an airplane does not cause suffocation when the therapist 
is present), something that can be overcome by providing 
exposure treatments in multiple contexts.
In sum, conditioning effects in the lab and in clinical 
practice might well be mediated by propositional beliefs 
rather than associations. It could even be that recent advances 
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in exposure therapy such as creating unexpected events 
or providing exposure experiences in multiple contexts 
is effective not because it strengthens and broadens the 
impact of inhibitory associations but because it strengthens 
and broadens the impact of novel propositional beliefs that 
are formed during exposure therapy. 
Not only can propositional models match some of the 
benefits of associative models for clinical psychology (e.g., 
their implications for exposure therapy), they also have 
important additional benefits, at least for cognitively-
oriented clinical psychologists (see Lovibond, 2011, for 
an excellent and more extensive discussion of the merits 
of propositional models of conditioning for clinical 
psychology). First, propositional models fit well with the 
core assumption of cognitive therapies that beliefs are 
central in psychological suffering (e.g., Beck et al., 1990; 
Clark, 1986; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). As I noted 
earlier, whereas simple associations cannot fully capture 
the informational complexity of the kind of beliefs that 
clinical psychologists often encounter in patients (e.g., the 
distinction between airplanes causing death or facilitating 
other causes of death), propositions can.2
Second, propositional models highlight that stimulus 
pairings are just one possible source of beliefs and thus 
psychological suffering. Actually experiencing a traumatic 
event in which an initially neutral event (e.g., being in an 
airplane) co-occurs with an aversive event (e.g., having a 
panic attack) could indeed give rise to negative beliefs 
about flying (e.g., “I am likely to die when I take the 
airplane”). But similar negative beliefs about flying can 
also result from or be maintained by verbal information 
(e.g., reading about a recent plane crash on the news), 
observation (e.g., seeing images of a plane crash or seeing 
other people being terrified of airplanes), or inferences 
(e.g., the conclusion that heart attacks on airplanes are 
likely to be fatal based on the knowledge that heart attacks 
are likely to be fatal when one does not get to the hospital 
in time and the knowledge that it is impossible to get to 
the hospital when you are stuck in an airplane mid-flight). 
Also for treatment, there are likely to be interactions 
between the different sources of belief revision such as 
experiencing events (the effects of which are typically 
studied in conditioning research; e.g., Bouton, 2016; 
Catania, 2013), verbal messages (the effects of which are 
typically studied in persuasion research; e.g., Cialdini, 
1984), and the observation of others (the effects of which 
are studied in social learning research; e.g., Rendell et al., 
2011). Hence, for cognitive therapists who are seeking to 
reduce psychological suffering by changing pathogenic 
beliefs, it makes perfect sense to adopt a propositional 
perspective on conditioning because it allows them to 
fully integrate conditioning-based treatment techniques 
such as exposure with other techniques that are based 
on persuasion and social learning. All these sources can 
jointly be directed at achieving belief-revision (also see 
Lovibond, 2011, for a discussion and Lovibond, Mitchell, 
Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009, for a concrete example of 
how beliefs and behavior interact). 
More recently, so-called “third-wave” therapies such as 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) have been put 
forward that focus not so much on changing the content 
of beliefs but individuals’ relationship with their beliefs (as 
well as the relationship with other forms of private behavior 
such as emotions; e.g., Flaxman, Blackledge, & Bond, 2011; 
Hayes, 2004). For instance, rather than trying to convince 
our patient with fear of flying that flying is safe, some 
“third-wave” therapists would learn the patient to distance 
oneself from the fear evoked while flying. Unlike association 
formation models of conditioning, propositional models 
of conditioning also fit well with these therapies. Most 
importantly, third wave therapies are built on the idea that 
patients suffer because of the way they deal with certain 
beliefs (e.g., because they avoid disturbing thoughts). As I 
noted above, the full complexities of those beliefs can be 
captured at the cognitive level more naturally by assuming 
the existence of propositional representations in memory 
than by assuming associations.3 From a propositional 
perspective, conditioning research can inform us about 
the way in which people approach their beliefs and how 
this influences behavior. For instance, using conditioning 
procedures (e.g., the pairing of a shock and triangle) as a way 
to install fear-related beliefs (e.g., that the triangle will be 
followed by a shock) allows one to study which acceptance 
interventions are effective in reducing conditioned fear or 
avoidance.
Next to the strengths of propositional models as a 
cognitive framework for thinking about the relation 
between conditioning and psychological suffering, 
propositional models also have their limitations. Most 
importantly, they have little to say about when and how 
beliefs influence behavior. For instance, propositional 
models as such do not specify why certain beliefs 
influence behavior in a particular way, nor do they 
explain why beliefs sometimes have no behavioral effects 
(Mitchell et al., 2009).  As pointed out by an anonymous 
reviewer, certain behaviors can be seen as a rather direct 
consequence of having a belief (e.g., when someone with 
social anxiety starts to blush based on the expectancy that 
she will be evaluated negatively). However, also in these 
cases, it is difficult to say on the basis of the underlying 
belief why certain reactions occur and not others (e.g., 
blushing rather than becoming pale).  Note, however, that 
also association formation models of conditioning do not 
always provide a good account of behavior change (e.g., 
see Bouton, 2016, pp.187-193, for a discussion). Hence, 
better understanding the nature of behavior change poses 
a challenge for conditioning research at large.
Exploiting Conditioning Research Without 
Committing to a Cognitive Theory of 
Conditioning
On the Nature and Merits of the Functional Level of 
Explanation
Until now I have argued that (a) conditioning does not have 
to be thought of in terms of association formation and that 
(b) there is merit in considering the idea that conditioning 
is due to propositional processes. It is important to realize, 
however, that both associative and propositional models 
of conditioning are situated at the cognitive level of 
explanation: they specify assumptions about the mental 
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processes and representations via which the pairing 
of stimuli leads to changes in behavior. For cognitively-
oriented (clinical) psychologists, these cognitive models 
of conditioning have merit because they (1) provide 
possible answers to questions about how conditioning 
comes about and (2) generate novel predictions about the 
conditions under which conditioning effects strengthen 
and weaken. For instance, the inhibitory learning model 
is one of those cognitive theories that led to interesting 
predictions about how to optimize exposure treatment 
(e.g., Craske et al., 2014). For cognitively-oriented clinical 
psychologists it is important to distinguish between 
associative and propositional models of conditioning 
because these models provide different answers and 
generate different predictions concerning the role of 
conditioning in psychological suffering.
Despite these merits of cognitive theories, it is also 
possible and useful to think of conditioning independent 
of cognitive processes. This can be achieved by defining 
conditioning as an effect, that is, as the impact of 
regularities in the environment (e.g., the pairing of a 
triangle and shock) on behavior (e.g., fear of the triangle; 
De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; De Houwer & 
Hughes, 2020). Such a definition qualifies as a functional 
definition of conditioning in that behavior (fear of 
the triangle) is said to be a function of elements of the 
environment (pairing of triangle and shock). Earlier, I 
noted that defining conditioning as an effect has benefits 
for cognitive researchers in that it allows one to consider 
multiple cognitive theories of conditioning. Functional 
definitions have the additional advantage that they reveal 
a functional level of explanation that is separate from 
the cognitive level of explanation. By highlighting the 
environmental events that influence behavior, functional 
definitions provide a potential explanation of that 
behavior. For instance, the claim that a certain change in 
behavior (e.g., fear of flying) is an instance of conditioning 
entails that the change in behavior is due to the pairing of 
events in the environment (e.g., a traumatic event in which 
flying co-occurred with a panic attack) rather than some 
other environmental cause (e.g., the mere fact of being in 
an airplane) or genetic cause (e.g., some gene that triggers 
fear of flying). It does not identify the cognitive processes 
via which the pairing of those events leads to fear of flying 
(this is the aim and domain of cognitive explanations) but 
it does provide a potential explanation of how the fear 
of flying came about. Importantly, by doing so, functional 
explanations allow one to predict-and-influence behavior: 
if behavior A (e.g., fear of flying) is a function of event B 
(e.g., having a panic attack mid-flight), then the presence 
of elements of event B (e.g., being in an airplane) allows 
one to predict behavior A (e.g., fear) and the manipulation 
of event B (e.g., decreasing the strength of the relation 
between flying and panic attach via exposure) allows one 
to influence behavior A (e.g., less panic attacks). 
When viewed from a strictly functional perspective, 
conditioning research informs us about the conditions 
under which the experience of co-occurring events 
influences behavior, as well as the nature of the events 
that are necessary to counteract those effects. Importantly, 
conditioning research provides these insights regardless 
of whether we know the cognitive processes and 
representations via which co-occurring events influence 
behavior (also see Eelen, 2018). For instance, the fact that 
repeated exposure to a stimulus can reduce conditioned 
fear responses to that stimulus holds independently of 
whether these reductions are due to changes in associations 
or changes in propositional beliefs. Especially for applied 
psychologists such as clinical practitioners, what matters is 
whether a procedure is effective in changing behavior and 
not so much why it is effective (see De Houwer, 2011, and 
Hughes, De Houwer, & Perugini, 2016, for a more detailed 
discussion of the relation between the functional and 
cognitive levels of explanation and De Houwer, Hughes, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2017, for an extensive discussion of why 
the functional level of explanation is primary in applied 
psychology). Although clinical practitioners often resort to 
the cognitive level of explanation in order to understand 
the cognitive mechanisms of psychological suffering and 
therapy, it is important to realize that they could in principle 
operate solely at the functional level of explanation. 
Relational Frame Theory: A Functional Account 
of Language, Thinking, and Conditioning
An important reason why cognitively-oriented clinical 
psychologists might often turn to the cognitive 
level of explanation is that they believe that a strict 
functional analysis of psychological suffering in terms 
of conditioning does not allow them to capture the full 
complexity of what they encountered in their clinical 
practice (Hayes, 2004). More recently, however, a new 
functional conceptualization of conditioning has been put 
forward that can enrich strict functional analyses. More 
specifically, proponents of Relational Frame Theory (RFT) 
have argued that conditioning is not simply a matter of 
co-occurring events causing a change in behavior. Rather a 
relation between the presence of events could function as 
a contextual relational cue, that is, something that signals 
the way in which events are related (also see Hughes, Ye, & 
De Houwer, 2019; De Houwer & Hughes, 2020). 
Again consider a prototypical fear conditioning 
experiment in which a triangle is repeatedly paired with 
an aversive shock. From the perspective of RFT, the pairing 
of the triangle and shock is not a direct cause of fear for 
the triangle but a cue that signals similarity between the 
triangle and shock, much like the sentence “the triangle 
goes together with the shock” signals similarity between 
both stimuli (Leader, Barnes, & Smeets, 1996). We know 
from basic learning research that language-capable 
humans can respond as-if stimuli are related in a certain 
way (e.g., that the word “glass” has things in common 
with the object glass; that “hate” is opposite to “love”) 
even when there is no physical basis for assuming such 
a relation. In technical terms, this pattern of behavior 
(e.g., acting as-if stimuli are equivalent, opposite, …) is 
called arbitrarily applicable relational responding (see 
Törneke, 2010, and Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for an 
accessible introduction to RFT). In less technical terms, one 
could say that conditioned behavior is symbolic behavior: 
behavior changes because the co-occurrence of events 
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functions as a symbol for the way in which the events 
are related (De Houwer & Hughes, 2016). Importantly, 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding is a behavioral 
phenomenon or effect, just like fear conditioning is a 
behavioral phenomenon or effect. Hence, it can be part of 
a strictly functional analysis. For instance, having a panic 
attack mid-flight can result in fear of flying not because 
the co-occurrence of the panic attack and being in an 
airplane is a direct cause of fear of flying but because 
it signals causal relation between the panic attack and 
flying. As a result of that event, the patient starts behaving 
as-if flying is equivalent to other things that evoke panic 
(e.g., suffocation), including an avoidance of flying. 
Because RFT views conditioning as a symbolic event, 
functional analyses that refer to conditioning can capture 
also the symbolic aspects of psychological suffering, 
something that is more difficult on the basis of pre-
RFT conceptualizations of conditioning. Hence, an RFT 
perspective on conditioning greatly increases the power 
and scope of strictly functional analyses of psychological 
suffering (also see Hughes, De Houwer, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2016). Note that RFT is one of the cornerstones of ACT (see 
Törneke, 2010, for a discussion). Although ACT in some 
ways goes beyond the functional level of explanation (see 
De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for 
more details), the role of RFT in the development of ACT 
attests to its relevance for clinical psychology.
When clearly separating the functional and cognitive 
levels of explanation, it becomes possible to appreciate 
the fact that RFT-based analyses (which are located at the 
functional level of analysis) are highly compatible with 
propositional models of conditioning (which are located 
at the cognitive level of explanation). RFT highlights 
the relational nature of behavior: people act as-if events 
are related in a certain manner (e.g., are similar or 
opposite). From a cognitive perspective, the ability to 
respond relationally (a behavioral phenomenon) requires 
cognitive representations that can encode information 
about specific types of relations. As noted above, unlike 
simple associations, propositional representations 
can encode this information. In sum, although RFT 
and propositional models of conditioning are situated 
at different levels of explanation and are therefore 
fundamentally different, they are highly compatible (see 
De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for a more 
detailed discussion of the relation between RFT and 
propositional models).
Conclusion
There are different ways in which one can think about the 
role of conditioning research in clinical psychology. Unlike 
to what many cognitively-oriented clinical psychologists 
seem to believe, the role of conditioning research is 
not limited to revealing ways in which pathogenic 
associations in memory are formed and can be changed. 
Conditioning research can also be seen as informing 
clinical psychologists about the way in which the spatio-
temporal co-occurrence of events leads to the formation 
of propositional beliefs and how those beliefs can be 
revised. Hence, both associative and propositional models 
of conditioning can help clinical psychologists (a) to think 
about the mechanisms underlying psychological suffering 
and treatment and (b) to design new ways of reducing 
psychological suffering. Finally, the merits of conditioning 
research do not hinge upon the validity of current 
theories about the mental processes and representations 
that mediate conditioning effects. Instead, conditioning 
research contributes to a functional level of explanation 
by revealing the environmental causes of behavior and 
psychological suffering. From the perspective of RFT, 
conditioning research can even inform us about complex 
relational behavior akin to verbal symbolic behavior, which 
again sets the stage for new ways of tacking psychological 
suffering (e.g., ACT). From all of these points of view, 
conditioning research has the potential to continue to 
inspire clinical psychology for many years to come. 
Notes
 1 In this paper, I focus on classical conditioning rather 
than operant conditioning because within cognitively-
oriented clinical research, the former has had more 
impact than the latter (e.g., Craske et al., 2006). 
However, a similar argument can be developed for 
operant conditioning.
 2 An anonymous reviewer correctly pointed out that the 
role of beliefs in conditioning has been highlighted 
also in expectancy theories and that these theories 
also had an impact in clinical psychology (e.g., Davey, 
1992; Kirsch, 2004; Reiss, 1980). Expectancy theories 
postulate that (a) the presence of event A leads to the 
expectancy of event B when A and B have been paired in 
the past and that (b) conditioned changes in behavior 
(e.g., fear of flying) are the direct consequence of these 
expectancy beliefs. Although expectancy theories 
can be seen as a precursor of propositional theories 
of conditioning (e.g., Lovibond, 2011), there are two 
important differences. First, expectancy theories focus 
on just one type propositional belief: the proposition 
that one event will follow another event. Second, 
expectancy theories are often (implicitly) grounded in 
association formation models. In fact, in its simplest 
form, an expectancy theory is an associative model in 
which the associative activation of a representation 
(e.g., activation of the representation of a panic attack 
as the result of being in an airplane) results in the 
conscious expectancy that the represented event will 
actually occur (e.g., that a panic attack is bound to 
take place; De Houwer, 2018b). As elegantly argued 
by Jozefowiez (2018), this idea is problematic, if only 
because representations can also be activated without 
generating the expectancy that the represented 
event will actually take place in the near future (e.g., 
thinking about a holiday in Greece without expecting 
to be in Greece; also see Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & 
Van den Bergh, 1992). However, expectancy theories 
that acknowledge the role of propositional beliefs 
other than expectancies and that reject the formation 
of simple associations as the mechanism of belief 
formation can be regarded as propositional models 
(De Houwer, 2018a).
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 3 The term “belief” can be used at the functional level 
to refer to a behavioral phenomenon (e.g., a pattern of 
relational behavior) and at the mental level to refer to 
a mental representation. Although it is important to 
recognize the fundamental difference between those 
two conceptualizations, it seems safe to conclude that, 
from a cognitive perspective, beliefs as behavioral 
phenomena are necessarily mediated by propositional 
beliefs as mental representations.
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